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I. INTRODUCTION 
Health care providers1 in the United States operate in a 
complex regulatory and business environment that presents many 
 †  Chief Counsel to the Inspector General, Department of Health and 
Human Services, Office of Inspector General. 
 ††  Senior Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of 
Inspector General. 
 †††   Associate Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of 
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risks. Providers need to manage compliance risks inherent in 
operating in this environment. The United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) assesses risks across HHS programs, including Medicare and 
Medicaid, to inform its priorities in audits, evaluations, 
investigations, administrative enforcement, and other activities.2 As 
a government agency that values transparency, OIG maintains and 
continually updates information on its website that can inform 
providers about risk areas for those operating in Federal health care 
programs.3  
OIG uses information gained from audits, evaluations, and 
enforcement actions to educate providers through guidance that 
can inform voluntary compliance efforts. OIG’s goals in promoting 
health care industry compliance are for providers to: (1) comply with 
Federal health care program requirements, (2) self-identify 
compliance issues as they arise, and (3) appropriately address such 
issues.  
Inspector General. Thank you to our coworkers who helped make this article 
possible: Megan Tinker, Erin Bliss, Rob Penezic, Susan Gillin, Nicole Caucci, 
Meredith Williams, Katie Fink, Stuart Wright, Jeffrey Cohen, and Mariel Filtz. 
1. In this article, we use the term provider broadly to include any individual
or entity that directly or indirectly furnishes items or services payable by federal 
health care programs.  
2. The OIG’s purpose is to “promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness”
and to “prevent and detect fraud and abuse” in HHS programs, including Federal 
health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Inspector General Act of 1978, 
as amended, § 2(2) (amended 2008) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3 
§ 2(2)). The Inspector General Act establishes inspectors general at all cabinet-level
departments and many other agencies. § 2. HHS OIG is distinguishable from other 
federal inspector general offices because of the size (over $1 trillion annual budget) 
and scope of HHS, as well as the unique enforcement and guidance authorities for 
which HHS OIG is responsible. See About Us, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/about-oig/about-us/index.asp 
[https://perma.cc/7Y39-YKDD] (last visited July 31, 2018) (explaining the 
structure of the HHS OIG and what the services they provide).  
3. Federal health care programs include “any plan or program that provides
health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is funded 
directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government (other than the 
[Federal Employees Health Benefits Program]), or any State health care program.” 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f) (2012); accord 42 C.F.R. § 1000.10 (2017). OIG’s 
enforcement and guidance responsibilities encompass all Federal health care 
programs, including programs administered outside of HHS, like those run by the 
Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs. See 42 C.F.R. § 1000.10.  
2
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss4/1
2018] THE OIG’S SHARED GOALS 1147 
OIG and providers share an interest in identifying and 
mitigating risks, and providers should use OIG’s information to 
guide their own risk analysis, identify compliance issues, and take 
corrective action when issues arise, including fulfilling report and 
return obligations under the sixty-day rule and self-disclosing fraud 
issues. As OIG continues to use all its tools to identify and address 
risks for HHS programs, health care providers should use the 
resources OIG shares with the public to guide their own compliance 
efforts and reduce organizational and individual risks. 
II. HOW OIG PROMOTES COMPLIANCE
OIG promotes compliance through a process that identifies 
fraudulent and abusive practices in Federal health care programs,4 
educates the industry on risk areas and voluntary compliance 
measures,5 and uses targeted enforcement to prevent and deter 
providers from defrauding and abusing the programs.6 
A. Identify Risk Areas that Could Lead to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in 
Medicare & Medicaid 
OIG uses a variety of tools to identify risks to Medicare and 
Medicaid. Audits and evaluations identify specific practices and 
nationwide trends that can lead to improper billing or 
noncompliance.7 OIG’s in-house data experts use data analytics to 
identify trends and outliers that focus OIG efforts on higher risk 
specialties, issues, geographic areas, and providers.8 Through OIG’s 
hotline, the public provides tips or information that can lead to an 
investigation.9 Many investigations are initiated by qui tam 
complaints under the False Claims Act (FCA).10 OIG uses the above 
4. See infra Section II.A.
5. See infra Section II.B.
6. See infra Section II.C.
7. See infra Sections II.B.2 and II.B.3.
8. See A Message from the Inspector General, in OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS APR. 1, 2017–SEPT. 30, 
2017 (2017). 
9. See Report Fraud, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/report-fraud [https://perma.cc/M6CY-7T5P] 
(last visited July 31, 2018). 
10. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730–33 (2012). Qui tam complaints are civil actions brought
by private persons for FCA violations for both the person and the United States. Id. 
§ 3730(b).
3
Demske et al.: Shared Goals: How the HHS Office of Inspector General Supports He
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
1148 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:4 
methods, tips, and traditional law enforcement techniques to 
identify and investigate persons who may be defrauding HHS 
programs or harming program beneficiaries.11 OIG investigations 
often lead to criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement actions.12 
Identifying risk areas promotes compliance by giving the industry 
notice of improper conduct, which deters like conduct and 
highlights areas of focus for a provider’s voluntary compliance 
efforts.13 
B. Educate Industry on Risks and Compliance 
OIG operates with a high degree of transparency, which gives 
providers insight into the issues OIG subjects to audits or evaluations 
(either in the past, currently, or as planned for the future), 
enforcement priorities and outcomes, and OIG’s perspective on 
many compliance issues.14  
1. Work Plan and Semiannual Report
Perhaps the most widely followed tool OIG uses to 
communicate with the industry is the Work Plan.15 The Work Plan 
lists ongoing and upcoming OIG audits, evaluations, and other 
11. See Office of Investigations, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/about-oig/about-us/office-of-investigations.asp 
[https://perma.cc/WB4V-V8XG] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
12. See Enforcement Actions, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/index.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
WUV9-8LCC] (last visited July 31, 2018) (showing the different enforcement actions 
OIG takes). While enforcement actions indicate risk areas, these actions often do 
not become public until years after the conduct occurred, making them a lagging 
indicator of risk relative to other publicly available information discussed in this 
article. 
13. HHS and the Department of Justice annually publish a report summarizing
efforts to combat health care fraud and abuse under the Health Care Fraud and 
Abuse Control (HCFAC) program. See Health Care Fraud and Abuse Program 
Control Report, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/hcfac [https://perma.cc/UFF5-
ZR46] (last visited July 31, 2018) (collecting the annual reports from 1997 to 2016). 
14. See infra Section II.B.1.
15. Work Plan, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/workplan/index.asp [https://per 
ma.cc/4QWY-VBEY] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
4
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work.16 It is a living document that is updated monthly17 and presents 
OIG’s priorities.18 The Work Plan provides a window into OIG’s 
response to program risk areas or emerging trends, like the opioid 
crisis.19 Providers can review the Work Plan to inform their own 
compliance and internal audit program priorities.20  
While the Work Plan is forward looking, OIG’s Semiannual 
Report to Congress21 highlights the audits, evaluations, 
investigations, and administrative actions OIG has completed in the 
past six months.22 OIG also updates its website daily to include the 
latest reports, publications, case results, guidance, and other 
issuances.23 
16. Id.
17. Before 2017, the OIG released a work plan once a year with occasional mid-
year updates. Work Plan, supra note 15. In June 2017, the OIG started updating the 
Work Plan monthly. Id. 
18. See id.; Active Work Plan Items, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/workplan/active-
item-table.asp [https://perma.cc/6WKN-E6KC] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
19. See, e.g., FDA Oversight of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies to Address
Prescription Opioid Abuse, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/workplan/summary/wp-summary-0 
000254.asp [https://perma.cc/KB4T-RT3C] (last visited July 31, 2018); SAMHSA 
Pre-Award Process for Opioid State Targeted Response Grants, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/ 
workplan/summary/wp-summary-0000247.asp [https://perma.cc/UV6S-T4DT] 
(last visited July 31, 2018). See generally Active Work Plan Items, supra note 18 (listing 
OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections that are underway or planned). 
20. Gregory Demske, Chief Counsel to the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., Keynote Address at the Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 
Law Review Symposium: OIG Priorities in 2018 (Mar. 16, 2018). 
21. The OIG is required to submit semiannual reports to Congress. Inspector
General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5 (2012). 
22. See generally Archives—Semiannual Report, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/ 
archives/semiannual/index.asp [https://perma.cc/W2E8-U3KU] (last visited July 
31, 2018) (providing accessible archives of OIG’s semiannual reports). Similarly, as 
discussed below, the HHS-DOJ HCFAC report provides a retrospective summary of 
the federal government’s efforts to combat health care fraud and abuse. OFFICE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018). 
23. See generally What’s New, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/whats-new/index.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/FP8R-J536] (last visited July 31, 2018) (linking monthly OIG updates for 
2017 and 2018). 
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2. Audits and Evaluations
OIG’s audit and evaluation reports promote industry 
compliance efforts. These reports look at nationwide trends in HHS 
programs and examine individual providers’ compliance with 
applicable statutes, regulations, and other authorities.24 These 
reports often offer broad-based and practical recommendations for 
improvement.25 Information in the reports can help identify risk 
areas and can spur providers to strengthen internal controls to 
address such risk areas in their own activities.   
For example, in 2017, OIG issued a data brief looking at opioid 
prescribing in Medicare Part D.26 OIG’s analysis found about 400 
prescribers using questionable prescribing practices, placing 
beneficiaries at risk for overdose.27 Another example is OIG’s skilled 
nursing facilities work. In 2012 and 2015, OIG issued evaluation 
reports that found inappropriate payments for skilled nursing 
facility care.28 Compliance officers can build on OIG’s reports and 
focus their resources by looking for similar risk areas in their own 
organizations.29 An organization can improve its billing practices by 
conducting internal reviews related to risks identified in an audit or 
evaluation report.30 And, if the organization finds improper 
24. See Office of Audit Services, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/about-oig/about-us/office-of-audit-services.asp 
[https://perma.cc/XK5L-J8ZH] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
25. Id.; Office of Evaluation and Inspections (OEI), OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/about-oig/about-us/office-of-
evaluation-and-inspections.asp [https://perma.cc/U4CJ-P4MC] (last visited July 
31, 2018). 
26. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DATA BRIEF
NO. OEI-02-17-00250, OPIOIDS IN MEDICARE PART D: CONCERNS ABOUT EXTREME USE
AND QUESTIONABLE PRESCRIBING (2017). 
27. Id. at 6.
28. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-02-13-
00610, THE MEDICARE PAYMENT SYSTEM FOR SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES NEEDS TO BE
REVALUATED 2 (2015); OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
OEI-02-09-00200, INAPPROPRIATE PAYMENTS TO SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES COST
MEDICARE MORE THAN A BILLION DOLLARS IN 2009, 10 (2012). 
29. See HCCA-OIG COMPLIANCE EFFECTIVENESS ROUNDTABLE, MEASURING
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS: A RESOURCE GUIDE 15 (2017) [hereinafter 
RESOURCE GUIDE] (suggesting that compliance departments review regulations that 
effect an organization as part of a risk assessment). 
30. See id. (stating that compliance officers should keep up with any changes in
the law as part of their own risk assessment). 
6
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conduct, it can correct the problem and self-disclose,31 rather than 
face potential government-initiated32 enforcement action.33  
3. Federal Anti-Kickback Safe Harbors and OIG Advisory Opinions
The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) makes it a criminal 
offense for any person to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, 
or receive any remuneration to induce or reward referrals of items 
or services reimbursable by a Federal health care program.34 The 
statute is broad and potentially reaches relatively low-risk, 
innocuous, or even beneficial business practices.35 To address the 
broad reach of the statute, Congress enacted certain exceptions and 
authorized OIG to develop and promulgate safe harbor provisions.36 
31. See Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-
info/protocol.asp [https://perma.cc/K9ZQ-5R75] (last visited July 31, 2018); see 
also Provider Self-Disclosure Settlements, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/psds.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/964X-G6SZ] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
32. In this article, we use the term “government-initiated enforcement actions”
to include FCA qui tam matters filed by relators. 
33. For example, less than a year after OIG’s 2015 report on skilled-nursing
facilities (SNFs), a California skilled nursing facility entered the OIG self-disclosure 
protocol and agreed to pay $8.6 million for submitting claims to Medicare for skilled 
nursing services without proper certifications and re-certifications for services, 
establishment and content of therapy plans, and maintenance of clinical records. 
U.S. DEP’T. JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016, 25 (2017); see 
ROBERT K. DECONTI ET AL., HOT TOPICS IN FRAUD AND ABUSE: TREACHEROUS TRAILS,
PEAKS AND VALLEYS, AND OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME AT THE AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS 
ASSOCIATION, IN-HOUSE COUNSEL PROGRAM AND ANNUAL MEETING (2016). During the 
presentation, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs Robert DeConti 
highlighted this settlement and recommended that providers use OIG’s evaluations, 
among other work, to consider whether they should self-disclose improper 
payments to avoid government-initiated enforcement actions. 
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a–7b(b) (2012).
35. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-
Kickback, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (July 29, 1991). 
36. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-93, § 14(a), 101 Stat. 680, 697 (1987). Congress delegated authority to 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to create or modify 
regulatory safe harbors to the Anti-Kickback Statute. Specifically, section 14(a) of 
the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 gives the 
Secretary authority to develop regulations “specifying payment practices that shall 
not be treated as a criminal offense under section 1128B(b) of the Social Security 
Act and shall not serve as the basis for an exclusion under section 1128(b)(7) of 
7
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These provisions identify practices that are not subject to 
prosecution under the AKS; although they are potentially capable of 
inducing provider referrals of Federal health care program 
beneficiaries.37  
Under this authority, OIG has published twenty-eight safe 
harbors protecting financial arrangements such as investment 
interests, personal services and management contracts, space and 
equipment leases, and free local transportation.38 OIG periodically 
updates existing safe harbors and establishes new safe harbors to 
reflect changing health care industry practices.39 Although 
complying with a safe harbor is voluntary, by structuring or 
modifying their business practices to comply with safe harbors, 
“providers can be assured that their arrangements are immune from 
potential criminal and administrative sanctions under the Anti 
Kickback Statute.”40 The safe harbors and the accompanying 
regulatory preamble provide significant guidance about OIG’s views 
of AKS risks on many types of business arrangements.  
In addition to safe harbors, Congress requires OIG to issue 
advisory opinions about the application of OIG’s fraud and abuse 
authorities to the requesting party’s existing or proposed business 
arrangement.41 These opinions, issued in response to a party’s 
request, explain how OIG would apply its fraud and abuse 
authorities to the existing or proposed arrangement.42 Although 
advisory opinions protect only the requesting party or parties, health 
care industry participants, in the OIG’s experience, often find 
advisory opinions informative. Because they explain how OIG 
such Act.” Id. § 14(a). 
37. The statutory exceptions include discounts, for bona fide employees, and
group purchasing organizations and these exceptions are interpreted in the safe 
harbor regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A) (discounts exception); id. 
§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B) (bona fide employee exception); id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(C)
(group purchasing organizations exception). 
38. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2017).
39. Section 1128D(a) of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7d(a), requires OIG to issue an annual solicitation for new or modified safe harbors 
and special fraud alerts. OIG typically issues this solicitation in December of each 
year. See, e.g., Solicitation of New Safe Harbors and Special Fraud Alerts, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 61,229 (Dec. 27, 2017). 
40. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe
Harbors for Protecting Health Plans, 61 Fed. Reg. 2122, 2124 (Jan. 25, 1996). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d; 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008 (2017).
42. See, e.g., Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., OIG
Advisory Opinion No. 17-09 (Dec. 29, 2017). 
8
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applies certain administrative authorities to specific factual 
situations, advisory opinions provide useful insight into OIG’s views 
on AKS issues. OIG posts all issued advisory opinions on its website.43 
4. Guidance on Specific Risk Areas—Special Fraud Alerts, Special
Advisory Bulletins, and Other Publications
Since 1989, OIG has provided various types of guidance to the 
health care industry about risk areas—often focused on the AKS and 
the prohibition on beneficiary inducements.44 Special fraud alerts, 
special advisory bulletins, and similar documents identify practices 
that present risks of Federal health care program fraud, waste, or 
abuse.45 These documents often discuss factors OIG will consider to 
determine whether to investigate if an arrangement violates the AKS 
or another law.46 For example, in a 2013 special fraud alert, OIG 
addressed certain attributes of physician-owned distributorships that 
raise fraud and abuse risks and which may pose a danger to patient 
safety.47  
Other guidance documents explain OIG’s legal interpretations 
or enforcement approaches. For example, in a 2015 Policy 
Statement, OIG assured hospitals that they will not be subject to OIG 
administrative sanctions for discounting or waiving amounts 
Medicare beneficiaries may owe for self-administered drugs they 
43. See Advisory Opinions, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/advisory-opinions/index.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/2KYA-Y3QT] (last visited July 31, 2018). Posted advisory opinions redact 
the identity of the requesting party and other named persons. 
44. See Bulletins, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts/bulletins/index.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
A6RB-7SPJ] (last visited July 31, 2018); Other Guidance, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts/ 
guidance/index.asp [https://perma.cc/8CTU-9C7Z] (last visited July 31, 2018); 
Special Fraud Alerts, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts/index.asp [https://perma.cc/6NS 
3-AK9R] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
45. See Other Guidance, supra note 44.
46. E.g., Special Fraud Alert, Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health &
Human Servs., Laboratory Payments to Referring Physicians (June 15, 2014), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/2014/oig_sfa_laboratory_pay
ments_06252014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3VS-SDBD]. 
47. Special Fraud Alert, Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human
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receive in outpatient settings when those drugs are not covered by 
Medicare Part B.48 Other information, although not found in the 
“compliance” section of OIG’s website, provides insight into risk 
areas in health care. For example, OIG’s “Eye on Oversight” videos 
provide short summaries of OIG focus areas.49 More in-depth 
discussions of OIG work on priority areas are found in the “Portfolio” 
section of the website, which brings together OIG audits, 
evaluations, investigations, enforcement, and guidance work on a 
subject area such as home health50 or Medicare Part D.51 Together, 
these guidance documents identify areas of OIG focus and potential 
risk areas that providers may want to target in their compliance 
efforts. 
5. Guidance on Compliance Best Practices
In addition to guidance focused on risk areas, OIG has provided 
guidance to the health care industry about compliance best practices 
for decades.52 Recently, OIG and the Health Care Compliance 
48. Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., OIG Policy
Statement Regarding Hospitals That Discount or Waive Amounts Owed by Medicare 
Beneficiaries for Self-Administered Drugs Dispensed in Outpatient Settings (Oct. 
29, 2015), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts/guidance/policy-10302015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FR2-WTPN]. 
49. Eye on Oversight Video Series, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/video/2016/eoo/index.asp [http 
s://perma.cc/Q6A5-Q2XP] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
50. OIG Online Portfolio: Home Health, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/port 
folio/home-health/ [https://perma.cc/PQ5K-8UAT] (last visited July 31, 2018).  
51. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-03-15-
00180, ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF MEDICARE PART D (2015). 
52. See, e.g., OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing
Facilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 56,832, 56,833 (Sept. 30, 2008). See generally Compliance 
Guidance, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/index.asp [https://perm 
a.cc/V56Z-ZSTS] (last visited July 31, 2018). For example, from 1998 through 2008,
OIG issued a series of compliance program guidance (CPG) documents. Id. The 
CPGs, aimed at “various segments of the health care industry, such as hospitals, 
nursing homes, third-party billers, and durable medical equipment suppliers,” 
encourage “the development and use of internal controls to monitor adherence to 
applicable statutes, regulations, and program requirements.” Id. Despite not being 
“model compliance program[s],” the CPGs remain resources for various types of 
providers in setting up or improving a compliance program, although providers 
must also be aware of evolving risk areas not reflected in the CPGs. Id.  
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss4/1
2018] THE OIG’S SHARED GOALS 1155 
Association (HCCA) collaborated on a compliance officer 
roundtable that resulted in a Resource Guide listing ideas of “what 
to measure” and “how to measure” compliance program 
effectiveness.53 As with other OIG guidance documents, the 
Resource Guide does not require any action. In fact, OIG and HCCA 
explicitly explained that the document is not a checklist and that 
“[a]ny attempt to use this as a standard or a certification is 
discouraged by those who worked on this project; one size truly does 
not fit all.”54  
OIG also issues guidance in a variety of forms to assist a range 
of people involved in health care. For example, OIG has issued a 
series of guidance documents for boards of directors of health care 
entities55 and a “Roadmap for New Physicians” brochure that 
summarizes major fraud and abuse risks that affect physicians.56 The 
OIG website also includes many training videos, webcasts, and 
written materials on a variety of issues (e.g., the FCA, the AKS, 
exclusions, self-disclosure) that may interest providers and their 
compliance officers.57  
OIG guidance gives providers tools and information to aid their 
efforts to comply with Federal health care program requirements. 
Providers are in the best position to determine how to use this 
information to advance compliance goals within the context of each 
providers’ industry sector, structure, operations, and resources.  
53. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 29.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Compliance Resource Materials, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/compl 
iance-resource-material.asp#hcb [https://perma.cc/AB74-PDYY] (last visited July 
31, 2018); see In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (recognizing the duty of board members to undertake reasonable efforts to 
promote compliance). 
56. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A ROADMAP
FOR NEW PHYSICIANS: AVOIDING MEDICARE & MEDICAID FRAUD & ABUSE (2017) 
[hereinafter ROADMAP]; see also Continuing Medical Education, OFFICE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/ 
101/cme.asp [https://perma.cc/8JHG-B687] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
57. Compliance Education Materials, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/101/index.asp [http:// 
perma.cc/XV4Y-GA65] (last visited July 31, 2018).  
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C. Amplify OIG Work and Provide Guidance Through Enforcement 
OIG uses its administrative enforcement tools of exclusion and 
Civil Money Penalties (CMP) to support and amplify OIG work, and 
to protect Federal health care programs and their beneficiaries.  
1. Exclusions
OIG has authority to exclude individuals and entities who have 
engaged in fraud, abuse, or other misconduct from participation in 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other Federal health care programs.58 
Exclusion is a remedial measure that prohibits Federal health care 
program payment for any item or service furnished, directly or 
indirectly, by an excluded person.59   
Although most exclusions are derivative,60 OIG has broad 
authority to initiate its own affirmative exclusion of a person if OIG 
can prove, for example, that the person submitted or caused to be 
submitted to a Federal health care program claims that the person 
knows or should know61 were false or fraudulent.62 This false claims 
exclusion authority parallels the FCA in its substantive elements.63 
Because of this, in FCA cases involving Federal health care programs, 
OIG generally resolves its exclusion actions at the same time the 
Department of Justice resolves its civil monetary claims.64 Consistent 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2012); 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001 (2017).
59. See generally Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs.,
Special Advisory Bulletin on the Effect of Exclusion from Participation in Federal 
Health Care Programs (May 8, 2013), https://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/files/sab-
05092013.pdf [https:// perma.cc/J92V-XE7Q] (describing exclusion’s effect). 
60. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(a)–(b). We use the term “derivative” to describe
exclusions that are based on a finding by an outside tribunal, e.g., a conviction in 
state or federal court or a revocation of a license to provide health care. See id. The 
vast majority of OIG exclusions are derivative. See id. 
61. Id. § 1320a-7a(i)(7) (defining the term “should know” in the CMP statute
to mean “reckless disregard” or “deliberate ignorance,” so this knowledge standard 
is the same as that in the False Claims Act).  
62. Id. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (authorizing OIG to pursue an affirmative exclusion
for violations that would form the basis for an OIG CMP under id. § 1320a-7a). OIG 
can also pursue affirmative exclusions for many other offenses, including violations 
of the AKS and causing the furnishing of services that are medically unnecessary or 
fail to meet professionally recognized standards of care. Id. § 1320a-7(b)(6)(B). 
63. Id. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (authorizes exclusion for violations of § 1320a-7a).
Compare id. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(B), with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
64. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Office of
Inspector General’s Exclusion Authorities, 82 Fed. Reg. 4100, 4102 (Jan. 12, 2017). 
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with its commitment to transparency, OIG has explained the factors 
that it will consider to place a person along a risk spectrum that 
ranges from exclusion to an administrative release with no further 
action.65 
2. Corporate Integrity Agreements
Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) are a means of reducing 
the risk a provider poses to the Federal health care programs while 
allowing the provider to continue furnishing items and services paid 
for by these programs.66 CIAs are process-focused documents that 
require mechanisms that OIG believes support the goals of 
compliance.67  
In the mid-1990s, OIG began requiring defendants in FCA cases 
to enter into CIAs in exchange for an administrative exclusion 
release.68 Since then, OIG has changed its approach to reflect the 
maturation of compliance in the health care industry. For example, 
OIG initially sought CIAs in every FCA case in which it was not 
seeking exclusion.69 Today, in FCA case resolutions, OIG uses its 
section 1128(b)(7) risk analysis to determine whether a CIA is the 
best way to achieve a positive outcome.70 OIG now requires CIAs in 
65. Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Opinion Letter
on Criteria for Implementing Section 1128(b)(7) Exclusion Authority (Apr. 18, 
2016) [hereinafter Criteria], https://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/files/1128b7exclus 
ion-criteria.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K32-QK5H].  
66. Corporate Integrity Agreements, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/ 
index.asp [https://perma.cc/68TS-HPLV] (last visited July 31, 2018).  
67. CIAs typically last five years and include requirements to: (1) hire a
compliance officer; (2) develop written standards and policies; (3) implement a 
comprehensive employee training program; (4) retain an independent review 
organization to conduct annual reviews; (5) establish a confidential disclosure 
program; (6) screen and restrict employment of excluded persons; (7) report 
overpayments, reportable events, and ongoing investigations or legal proceedings; 
and (8) regularly report to OIG on the status of the entity’s compliance activities. 
Id. CIA requirements reflect the compliance standards in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. See generally U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 389–91 
(Nov. 1, 2016). 
68. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAMS: A 30-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 38 (2006)
[hereinafter PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH].  
69. Id. at 39.
70. Criteria, supra note 65, at 2.
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cases involving significant monetary loss, patient harm, or other 
factors indicating significant ongoing risk from the provider.  
Further, CIAs have evolved from focusing on compliance 
infrastructure and employee training to placing more emphasis on 
risk assessment.71 Current CIA requirements encourage providers to 
implement a proactive compliance program that takes steps to assess 
and mitigate risks and actively prevent fraud, including the use of 
risk-based reviews.72   
CIAs have also evolved to focus more on the organization’s 
leadership. Operating in a complex regulatory environment such as 
health care, compliance programs must include systems and controls 
such as those required in a CIA, but an organization’s compliance 
also depends on commitment and focus from the organization’s 
leaders.73 OIG has increasingly required board members, executives, 
and senior managers to certify compliance based on their duties and 
roles in the company.74 Providers should consider evolving CIA 
requirements as they focus on compliance risks and promote 
accountability for compliance among leadership and management 
positions and throughout their organizations. 
3. Civil Money Penalties
Civil money penalties (CMPs) are another means of addressing 
fraud.75 OIG uses CMPs to recover dollars, penalize wrongdoers, and 
71. This assertion comes from the authors’ own knowledge and experience in
creating CIAs. 
72. See, e.g., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND DIGNITY HEALTH (2014); 
OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE INTEGRITY
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND ANMED HEALTH (2017). 
73. Id. See generally OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH CARE GOVERNING BOARDS ON COMPLIANCE
OVERSIGHT (2015) [hereinafter PRACTICAL GUIDANCE]. 
74. PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 14. In contrast, older CIAs required
only the compliance officer to certify compliance with the CIA. Through dialogue 
with the industry, OIG determined that this process placed an undue burden on the 
compliance officer, who was not necessarily in control of the resources needed to 
implement the CIA successfully. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7a (2012); 42 C.F.R. pt. 1003 (2017). The Civil Monetary
Penalties Law allows OIG to impose penalties on individuals and entities that, 
among other things, submit false or fraudulent claims to the Federal health care 
programs, violate the AKS, or employ excluded individuals. Office Inspector Gen., 
14
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deter improper conduct.76 While the FCA is the federal 
government’s primary civil tool to address health care fraud, the 
CMP is a powerful supplement that allows OIG to fill enforcement 
gaps and bring cases that support OIG priorities.77 By coordinating 
CMP enforcement and compliance guidance efforts, OIG is able to 
amplify and reinforce messages to the public. For example, while 
DOJ successfully pursued an FCA case against a physician and an 
entity that had paid kickbacks to physicians through sham medical 
directorships and improper office staff arrangements,78 OIG 
pursued CMP cases against twelve physicians who received these 
kickbacks.79 After settling with the physicians, OIG issued an alert on 
suspect physician compensation arrangements that reward 
physicians for referrals.80 In another example, OIG issued an alert 
notifying the industry of improper arrangements between home 
health agencies and physicians after several FCA settlements and 
OIG reports identified home health as an area vulnerable to fraud.81 
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Special Advisory Bulletin, The Effect of 
Exclusion from Participation in Federal Health Care Programs (2013), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/files/sab-05092013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ FM7X-
4VNK]. 
76. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: APRIL
1–SEPTEMBER 30, 2010, III-4, 5 (2010) (identifying specific examples of CMPs 
imposed in various states); see Background, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/backgrou 
nd.asp [https://perma.cc/7L8J-VUWS] (last visited July 31, 2018) (describing 
instances where CMPs are commonly imposed). 
77. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over
$3.7 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/2CXR-YUU9].  
78. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas,
Prominent Houston Radiologist Settles False Claims Act Allegations (Aug. 14, 
2012), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/txs/1News/Releases/2012%20Aug 
ust/120814%20Baker.html [https://perma.cc/N6F7-9MPP]. 
79. Fraud Alert, Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs.,




81. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONWIDE
ANALYSIS OF COMMON CHARACTERISTICS IN OIG HOME HEALTH FRAUD CASES (June 
2016); Alert, Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Improper 
Arrangement and Conduct Involving Home Health Agencies and Physicians (June 
22, 2016), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts/guidance/HHA_%20Alert20 
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4. Self-Disclosure and the Sixty-Day Rule
Even well-intentioned providers operating strong compliance 
programs may engage in conduct triggering potential fraud 
liability.82 Since 1998, OIG has successfully operated a self-disclosure 
protocol allowing providers to resolve fraud claims.83 If a provider 
identifies an issue for which it faces potential fraud liability, it can 
disclose to OIG under the protocol,84 which has enabled OIG to 
resolve over 1,200 cases for $615 million.85 Relative to a potential 
government-initiated enforcement action, disclosure has several 
benefits: (1) faster resolution, (2) less disruption to operations, (3) 
lower payment, and (4) exclusion release with no CIA.86  
Providers that self-disclose compliance issues demonstrate their 
commitment to compliance through their actions.87 OIG therefore 
provides an exclusion release in self-disclosure settlements without 
reviewing any other information about the provider’s compliance 
program.88 OIG’s approach reflects its views on the goals of 
compliance. A provider’s compliance program infrastructure (e.g., 
policies and procedures, training, hotlines) is a critical process that 
advances compliance goals. This infrastructure is a means to achieve, 
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T53-EGV9].
82. OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed.
Reg. 4858, 4859 (Jan. 31, 2005) (“The OIG recognizes that implementation of a 
compliance program may not entirely eliminate improper or unethical conduct 
from the operations of health care providers.”). 
83. Notice, Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., OIG’s
Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol 1–2 (Apr. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Self-Disclosure 
Protocol], https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-info/files/Provider-Sel 
f-Disclosure-Protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/B35N-ZT5B]. 
84. Providers disclosing conduct that violates the Stark Law (section 1877 of
the Social Security Act) may use the CMS Voluntary Self-Referral Disclosure 
Protocol (SRDP). Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/ 
Self_Referral_Disclosure_Protocol.html [https://perma.cc/6HY4-SPYC] (last 
visited July 31, 2018). Providers should refund other self-identified overpayments to 
the appropriate CMS or state contractor. See Medicare Reporting and Returning of Self-
Identified Overpayments, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 11, 2016), 
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2016-Fact-
sheets-items/2016-02-11.html [https://perma.cc/87SV-94CH]. 
85. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Office of
Investigations, Self-Disclosure Resolutions 1998–2016. 
86. Self-Disclosure Protocol, supra note 83, at 2–3.
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id. at 13.
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among other things, the goal or outcome of the provider identifying, 
disclosing, and resolving compliance issues. In these circumstances, 
OIG believes a self-disclosure is a good outcome that eliminates the 
need to examine the provider’s compliance infrastructure. 
In addition to the existing reasons supporting self-disclosure, 
providers must now comply with the sixty-day rule.89 Under the 
sixty-day rule, upon receiving credible information of a potential 
overpayment, providers must: (1) exercise reasonable diligence to 
investigate the potential overpayment, (2) quantify the overpayment 
amount over a six-year lookback period, and (3) report and return 
any overpayments within sixty days of identifying those 
overpayments.90 Providers face significant FCA and CMP liability for 
failure to comply with the sixty-day rule.91 
This rule has other significant impacts. For example, OIG audits 
can trigger sixty-day rule obligations.92 Recently published OIG 
provider audits recommend that providers “exercise reasonable 
diligence to identify and return any additional similar overpayments 
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7k(d) (2012); see also Requirements for Reporting and
Returning of Overpayments, 42 C.F.R. § 401.305 (2017). 
90. 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7k(d); 42 C.F.R. §§ 401.305(a)–(f), 422.326, 423.360
(2017). 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(10) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 401.305(e); see, e.g., Kane
ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(providing an example of enforcement of the 60-day rule); Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, Manhattan U.S. Attorney 
Announces $2.95 Million Settlement With Hospital Group For Improperly Delaying 
Repayment Of Medicaid Funds (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-295-million-settlement-hospital-group-
improperly [https://perma.cc/BFE5-YDUT]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 
Southern District of Georgia, Pediatric Services of America and Related Entities to 
Pay $6.88 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Aug. 4, 2015), htt 
ps://www.justice.gov/usao-sdga/pr/pediatric-services-america-and-related-entities-
pay-688-million-resolve-false-claims [https://perma.cc/67YG-MG75]. OIG entered 
into a CIA with Pediatric Services of America that included specific requirements 
and an independent review organization claims review addressing the 
identification, quantification and repayment of overpayments. See OFFICE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES AND PEDIATRIC SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC., 13–14, App. C (2015).
92. See, e.g., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICARE COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF RUSH UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER (2017)
[hereinafter RUSH UNIVERSITY]; OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY 
HEALTHSYSTEM FOR 2013 AND 2014 (2016) [hereinafter NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY]. 
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received outside of [the] audit period, in accordance with the 
sixty-day rule, and identify any returned overpayments as having 
been made in accordance with this recommendation.”93 OIG 
believes that the findings of provider-specific audit reports constitute 
credible information of a potential overpayment to that provider, 
requiring the provider to take action pursuant to the sixty-day rule.94 
In this context, the findings in an audit report place a responsibility 
on the provider not only to respond directly to the report findings, 
but also to undertake an internal review that examines the full six-
year lookback period and which exceeds the time period covered by 
the audit.95 This internal review may result in a self-disclosure, or the 
return of an overpayment.96 In addition, a provider subject to an 
audit should consider whether the credible information of a 
potential overpayment compels it to undertake an internal review 
that includes similar overpayments in similarly situated facilities or 
service lines.97 For example, in 2017, following a recommendation 
included in an OIG audit,98 a hospital system conducted an internal 
review with a broader timeframe than the audit, and ultimately 
reported and returned an overpayment to Medicare.99  
5. The Future of OIG Administrative Enforcement
Over the past few years, OIG has increased its focus and 
resources on CMP and affirmative exclusion cases. OIG established 
a unit of attorneys focused on pursuing these cases and has pursued 
more and different types of CMP and affirmative exclusion cases.100 
93. See, e.g., RUSH UNIVERSITY, supra note 92, at 7.
94. See, e.g., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICARE COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF NEW YORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL FOR 2011 &
2012, ii (2016) [hereafter NEW YORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL]; NORTHSHORE
UNIVERSITY, supra note 92. 
95. See, e.g., NEW YORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, supra note 94; NORTHSHORE
UNIVERSITY, supra note 92. 
96. See, e.g., NEW YORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, supra note 94; NORTHSHORE
UNIVERSITY, supra note 92. 
97. As discussed throughout this article, even if a provider is not audited, it
should consider audit or evaluation findings related to its industry sector as it plans 
its proactive compliance activities.  
98. NEW YORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, supra note 94, at ii.
99. OIG at HHS (@OIGatHHS), TWITTER (Jun. 30, 2017, 7:21 AM),
https://twitter.com/OIGatHHS/status/880793507287453696 [https://perma.cc/ 
CT8Z-MDYL]. 
100. In 2017, OIG recovered $44.1 million through CMP settlements, an 
18
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Congress has continued to grant OIG additional CMP and exclusion 
authority.101 In addition to its traditional sources of investigative 
referrals, OIG now initiates many CMP and affirmative exclusion 
cases based on OIG audits, evaluations, and data analytics.102 For 
example, OIG work reports identifying vulnerabilities related to 
pediatric dentistry,103 urine drug tests,104 home health,105 and clinical 
increase from $17.1 million in 2011. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & 
Human Servs., Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, Analysis of Civil 
Monetary Penalty Recoveries. This figure includes CMP recoveries from OIG 
initiated CMP matters as well as matters self-disclosed through the Self-Disclosure 
Protocol.  
 101. For example, Congress recently granted OIG authority to investigate and 
pursue penalties against parties engaged in health care information blocking and 
parties engaged in grant or contract fraud against HHS. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-52(b) 
(2016); id. § 1320a-7a(o)–(s) (2012).   
 102. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1, 5 (2017).  
 103. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI 02-14-
00480, QUESTIONABLE BILLING FOR MEDICAID PEDIATRIC DENTAL SERVICES IN
CALIFORNIA (2015) (evaluating a pediatric dentistry OEI report); OFFICE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI 02-14-00120, QUESTIONABLE BILLING
FOR MEDICAID PEDIATRIC DENTAL SERVICES IN LOUISIANA (2014) (evaluating a 
pediatric dentistry OEI report); OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., OEI-02-12-00330, QUESTIONABLE BILLING FOR MEDICAID PEDIATRIC 
DENTAL SERVICES IN NEW YORK (2014) (evaluating a pediatric dentistry OEI report); 
California Dentist Settles Case Involving Medically Unnecessary Claims, on Civil Monetary 
Penalties and Affirmative Exclusions, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS. (May 15, 2017), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/cmp-
ae.asp [https://perma.cc/XRS4-EFCG]; Colorado Dentist Agrees to Voluntary Exclusion, 
on Civil Monetary Penalties and Affirmative Exclusions, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 12, 2015) (pediatric dentistry enforcement). 
 104. Press Release, Office Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human 
Servs., Drug Testing Company to Pay $5 Million Civil Money Penalty Settlement 
(Feb. 20, 2014) https://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/news-releases/2014/drug-cmp.asp 
[https://perma.cc/H4WN-K3E9] (explaining urine drug testing enforcement); 
ALJ Upholds OIG Civil Monetary Penalty and Exclusion Determination, on Civil Monetary 
Penalties and Affirmative Exclusions, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., (Aug. 29, 2016); Utah Pain Doctor and Medical Practice Settle False and 
Fraudulent Medicare Claims Case, on Civil Monetary Penalties and Affirmative Exclusions, 
OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., (July 21, 2017) 
 105. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONWIDE
ANALYSIS OF COMMON CHARACTERISTICS IN OIG HOME HEALTH FRAUD CASES (2016); 
OIG Online Portfolio: Home Health, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/portfolio/home-
health/enforcement.asp#mainBody [https://perma.cc/282Q-LTGP] (last visited 
July 31, 2018) (summarizing home-health-fraud enforcement actions). 
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laboratories106 generated CMP cases. Assessing risk in areas that have 
undergone review by OIG’s auditors and evaluators complements 
traditional investigative referrals and allows OIG to use enforcement 
actions to directly target risk areas and amplify OIG’s compliance 
message. We expect OIG to continue to build capacity and 
capability, and to increase the number and range of these cases. OIG 
will use its CMP and exclusion authorities to reinforce OIG 
priorities, fill enforcement gaps, deter misconduct, and protect the 
Federal health care programs and their beneficiaries. 
III. CONCLUSION
In promoting compliance, OIG’s goals are for providers to: (1) 
comply with requirements of Federal health care programs and 
provide high quality care to patients, (2) self-identify compliance 
issues when they arise, and (3) appropriately remediate and take 
corrective action in response to compliance issues.107 Because OIG 
and providers share an interest in identifying and mitigating risks, 
OIG’s work should inform providers’ compliance efforts. OIG 
targets risk areas for HHS and Federal health care programs in its 
audits, evaluations, investigations, and enforcement actions. In 
addition, OIG publishes guidance on risk areas and compliance best 
practices designed to help providers in their voluntary compliance 
efforts. Through all this work, OIG provides information that 
providers should use to address compliance risks, maintain a strong 
compliance program, identify compliance problems, and take 
corrective and remedial action when compliance issues arise.   
 106. OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE
PAYMENT FOR CLINICAL DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY TESTS IN 2016: YEAR 3 OF BASELINE
DATA (2017); OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE
PAYMENTS FOR CLINICAL DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY TESTS IN 2015: YEAR 2 OF BASELINE
DATA (2016); OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE
PAYMENTS FOR CLINICAL LABORATORY TESTS IN 2014: BASELINE DATA (2015). 
107. ROADMAP, supra note 56. 
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